I investigate the link between economic fundamentals and exchange rate adjustment to commodity price fluctuations.
Introduction
The complex relationship between commodity prices and exchange rates is of great interest to international economists and policymakers, especially for those focusing on resource-dependent open economies [See Edwards (1986) [6] , Chen and Rogoff (2003) [4] , Cashin et al. (2004) [3] , Aizenman et al. (2012) [2] .]. Despite the rich literature on exchange rate adjustment to commodity shocks, establishing causality under this context remains challenging because of simultaneity: it's possible that exchange rates fluctuations cause commodity prices to adjust [Chen et al. (2010) [5] ] or for commodity fluctuations to impact exchange rates under the assumption that open economies are price takers in the world commodity market 1 . Several studies report evidence of predictability or cointegration [Chen et al. (2010) [5] , Lee and Chen (2014) [10], Kohlscheen et al. (2017) [9] , among others.], oft considered the second-best approach when causal identification can't be achieved.
This paper takes an alternative approach to identify the causal effect of commodity prices on exchange rates. I exploit the September 14, 2019 surprise attack on two Saudi Arabian oil refineries as a natural experiment, where this completely unanticipated shock to global crude oil supplies sent world crude prices sharply higher, leading to the largest 1-day spike in over a decade. Using high-frequency data on exchange rates across 30 countries, I measure exchange rate adjustment around the window of the unanticipated oil shock and link the heterogeneity in exchange rate adjustment back to various country-specific fundamentals. Consistent with the literature, I find that both a country's trade-related oil exposure and financial/monetary conditions jointly explain exchange rate adjustment to the oil shock. Heavier crude exporters (importers) saw greater appreciation (depreciation). Current account surpluses (as opposed to deficits) and greater international reserves are associated with appreciation, thereby buffering depreciation effects on crude oil importers. Countries with higher policy interest rates, usually observed among Emerging Market economies, saw greater depreciation for any given level of crude oil exposure. At least in the very short-run, this evidence of exchange rate adjustment goes against the conventional view that exchange rates are un-responsive to commodity supply shocks [Basher et al. 
Crude Oil Prices
In Saudi Arabia on September 14, 2019, drones were used in a surprise attack on two of the largest Saudi Aramco oil refineries -state-owned facilities: Abqaiq and Khurais in Eastern Saudi Arabia (Figure 1 ). According to the Saudi Arabian interior ministry, the flames induced by the attack were put out relatively quickly, but both facilities were shut down for repairs, temporarily cutting the country's oil production (about 5 percent of global production) by about half. Despite the country communicating that it will tap into its oil reserves to buffer the supply shock, the news led the the sharpest one-day rise in global crude oil prices in over a decade. Figure 2 shows that as the futures market opened on the subsequent Sunday evening, crude oil futures prices jumped over 10 percent from roughly $55 per barrel to $61, and then continued to rise through Monday to a peak of over $63. While the attack happened while markets were closed, the opening gap largely represents the market response to the news, as no other news over the weekend was release that would have such a profoundly distinct impact on crude oil prices. 
Exchange Rate Adjustment
Meanwhile, as foreign exchange markets around the world opened, currency responses varied. Naturally, those countries which do not have oil-intensive dependencies continued to operate as 'business as usual'. In contrast, exchange rates of Russia, Norway, and Canada -major oil exporters -saw sudden appreciation. Other countries observed marked depreciation, including Turkey and South Africa. These countries tend to be oil importers, and also financially fragile. Figure 3 reports visually the heterogeneity observed in exchange rate responses before and after news of the oil supply shock. What determined the varying exchange rate responses to the oil shock? Visually, it appears that crude oil dependency is a relevant factor determining whether the exchange rate experienced meaningful adjustment. But as the theoretical literature suggests, there are other interactions which could amplify otherwise limited commodity exposure, such as a country's net financial position, credit worthiness, monetary regime, etc. I also compile a cross-sectional data set on country-specific trade and financial fundamentals from various public sources: UN COMTRADE, IMF, World Bank, and the CIA World Factbook. The most recent data is taken, mostly from 2018/2019, but on some occasions the statics are dated from 2017. Tables 2 and 3 report sample mean and standard deviations respectively, across all countries and for Developed Market Economies (DMEs) and Emerging Market Economies (EMEs) subgroups. China is by far, the largest country in the sample by GDP (over $12 trillion), which pulls up the average GDP of EMEs to be comparable to DMEs, though EME GDP is nearly twice as volatile. While most crude oil / refined petrol trade variables are balanced across countries, DMEs import considerably more refined petroleum than EMEs. EMEs also tend to have lower current count surpluses than DMEs, on average, along with larger external debt/GDP and lower public debt/GDP and international reserves/GDP. Policy interest rates are much higher and more varied among EMEs than DMEs. Many DMEs have rates pinned near the effective lower bound, explaining both their lower average level and standard deviation.
High-Frequency Identification
Truly exogenous macroeconomic shocks are rare. Therefore, the unanticipated attack on Saudi oil refinery's makes for a valuable case study because the direction of causality between commodity prices and exchange rates is unambiguous. Moreover, an isolated shock to a specific commodity -crude oil -provides valuable cross-sectional heterogeneity in exchange rates, which I aim to link back to the variation in fundamentals across countries. Highfrequency event studies are ubiquitous in the macro-finance literature (See Gurkaynak and Wright (2013) [7] for a survey. Aizenman et al. (2016) [1] and Neely (2015) [11] specifically look at exchange rate responses to monetary pol-icy in an event study framework). The key identification assumption is that within the window of the event, no other news or fundamental changes occur which would impact the exchange rate. Because we are analyzing a narrow window of exchange rate responses, the assumption is reasonably satisfied. Moreover, the fact that many non-exposed currencies saw no discernible effect is supportive of little to no other market-moving macroeconomic news announcements over the event period.
Cross-country fundamentals are taken as fixed over the event window. Because country fundamentals tend to evolve slowly, and almost certainly do not rapidly vary from day-to-day, the assumption of fundamentals being exogenous over the event window is very likely to hold. Moreover, since the data on fundamentals updates with a lag, using data from 2017-2019 up until the event also ensures against any potential endogeneity.
Regression Analysis
Let the percent change in the exchange rate vis-a-vis the USD (where positive change implies local appreciation against the USD) be denoted as:
where ∆e i,ab is the exchange rate percent return of country i from period b (before event) to period a (after event). E i,a and E i,b are the corresponding nominal exchange rate levels, before and after the event. For each country, the before-period corresponds to the exchange rate recorded at the close of 9/13. Most recorded closing values are from 16:30:00 EST, though closing times vary across FX markets 2 . Post-event exchange rates are mostly recorded on 9/15 20:00:00 3 . The constructed returns capture the percent change in exchange rates over the period of the oil shock.
The following regression specification tests the effect of fundamentals on exchange rate adjustment to the oil price shock:
where [OX i , OI i , RX i , RI i , CA i , ED i , P D i , IR i , r i ] ∈ X i and OX i and OI i are crude oil exports/GDP and crude oil imports/GDP, respectively. RX i and RI i are refined petroleum exports and imports (normalized by GDP). CA i is the current account surplus/GDP. ED i and P D i are external debt/GDP and public debt/GDP, respectively. IR i are international reserves/GDP, and r i is the nominal policy interest rate of the country. The intercept term, α, captures the average change vis-a-vis the USD across all exchange rates, or ∆ē ab . Because the average exchange rate return is statistically indifferent from zero, I restrict the regression intercept to equal zero to preserve degrees of freedom 4 . Table 1 reports sample cross-section correlations between exchange rate returns over the event period and different economic variables. Unsurprisingly, heavier exporters and importers of crude oil appreciated and depreciated on average following the supply shock. More intriguingly, exposure to refined petroleum trade is considerably weaker, and countries with higher interest rates also experienced depreciation, suggesting a role for financial fragility.
Results
The regression results are reported in Table 4 . Interesting interactions between a country's crude oil exposure and financial condition emerge. Refined petroleum exports and imports are not significant upon including crude oil imports and exports. Crude oil exporters and importers react to the oil shocks as expected, by appreciating and depreciating, respectively. Though the cumulative exchange rate change may have been economically small (Figure 3) , this evidence of reacting to a supply shock goes against the conventional view that exchange rates do not react to supply shocks -at least in the very short run 5 . The first few columns of the results highlight a potential asymmetry, where importers' exchange rates were doubly sensitive to the oil shock compared to exporters. The asymmetry disappears in column 5 upon including policy interest rates which itself has significant explanatory power over exchange rate responses. Column 5 implies that a country with exports (imports)/GDP of 0.05, or 5%, would have appreciated (depreciated) by an expected +0.48% (-0.64%) in response to the oil shock 6 . Conditional on exposure to crude oil, countries with higher policy rates, composed mostly of EMEs, saw their exchange rates depreciate more. Similarly, countries with current account deficits saw their exchange rates depreciate relative to those with surpluses, but this effect becomes insignificant after jointly including IR and policy rates. Crude importers will higher IR and lower policy rates saw their currencies buffered, depreciating less. Conversely, crude exporters with higher IR and lower rates saw their exchange rates appreciate more. Debt variables are insignificant, and the full specification can explain 62 percent of the cross-sectional variation in exchange rate responses around the oil shock, half of which (about 30%) is attributed to the country's crude oil exposure. Overall the results are consistent with the view that exchange rates adjust to oil shocks via both the trade channel and financial channels 7 .
A limitation of this study is that it is considering a single, specific event. Moreover, high-frequency identification comes at the cost of only obtaining short-run effect estimates. We cannot extend these short-run claims to the long-run. Despite this limitation, most studies on commodity currencies focus on the longer run, thus this approach provides a novel view of the phenomena.
Conclusion
Exchange rate adjustment to commodity price fluctuations is an important topic to understand for economists and policymakers, yet causal inference remains challenging. To overcome the issue of simultaneity, I exploit the September 14, 2019 drone attack on two Saudi Arabian refineries as a natural experiment. This unanticipated event caused the largest 1-day crude oil price spike in over a decade. Using high-frequency exchange rate data for 30 countries, I measure currency returns around the oil shock, and link crosscountry heterogeneity to country-specific trade and monetary fundamentals. Trade exposure through exports and imports of crude oil, international reserves holdings, policy interest rates, and current account position together explain over half of the cross-country variation in exchange rate adjustment to the oil price shock.
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